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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new, dynamic economic model of criminal activity. Individuals are
endowed with legal and criminal human capital. Potential incomes in legal and criminal sectors
depend on the level of the relevant human capital, the rate of return, and random shocks. Both types
of human capital can be enhanced by participating in the relevant sector. Legal human capital can
also be enhanced through savings. Each type of human capital is subject to depreciation. Individuals
maximize expected discounted lifetime utility, which depends on consumption. In this two-stage
dynamic stochastic model, in each period the individual decides in which sector to participate (legal
or illegal), and after the realization of income in that period, he decides on the optimal amount of
consumption. A particular decision (e.g. participation in the criminal sector) has implications both
for future decisions as well as the choices available to the individual in later periods.
The model allows analyses of the effects of recessions, neighborhood effects, various
imprisonment/rehabilitation scenarios, risk aversion, and time preferences on criminal behavior. It
provides new insights, which are different from existing models, and it is able to explain the
declining propensity of individuals to commit crimes over time.
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A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DIFFERENTIAL HUMAN CAPITAL AND CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY
I.  Introduction
Becker’s seminal paper (1968) created the foundation for the economic analysis of criminal
behavior.  Becker’s model, extended by Ehrlich (1973), postulates that participation in criminal
activity is the result of an optimizing individual’s response to incentives such as legal and illegal
market opportunities.   Rational economic agents decide to engage in criminal activity after
comparing the financial rewards from crime to those obtained from legal work, taking into
account the probabilities of apprehension and conviction and the severity of punishment.  More
precisely, in the Becker-Ehrlich model the individual maximizes a von Neumann–Morgenstern 
expected utility function, with arguments of the amount of time devoted to non-market activity
(which is fixed), and the consumption of a composite market good.  The individual can spend
time in both the legal and illegal markets, and the real return (in terms of income or the 
consumption good) in each market is a monotonically increasing function of time spent in that
market.  With a subjective probability p, the individual is apprehended and punished, which
reduces the level of income.  With probability (1-p) the individual escapes apprehension and
keeps the income generated in both markets.  Maximization of expected utility in this
framework generates a first-order condition, the analysis of which leads to a number of
behavioral implications.  For example, an increase in the probability of apprehension and the
severity of punishment reduces the incentive to participate in criminal activity, and these effects
are increasing in the agent’s degree of risk aversion.  Similarly, a decrease in legal real wages
increases the likelihood of criminal activity.
More recent models that proposed slight modifications to the Becker-Ehrlich model
produce ambiguous comparative static results.  For example, Block and Heineke (1975) pointed
out that if time spent in legal and illegal activities enter the utility function directly, comparative
static analyses cease to yield definitive results under traditional preference restrictions.  Schmidt
and Witte (1984) showed that in a model consisting of eight possible outcomes, (such as
employed and not apprehended; unemployed and not apprehended; unemployed, arrested but not
convicted; unemployed, arrested, convicted, and fined; etc.), one cannot determine the
relationship between criminal participation and the variables of interest without (in some cases)3
fairly strong assumptions.  For example, a negative relationship between time spent in illegal
activity and stiffer policing, prosecution, and judicial policies requires the assumption of risk
neutrality or decreasing absolute risk aversion with income.  The same assumptions are required
to establish that the impact of a marginal increase in the gains due to criminal activity on time
spent in illegal activity is positive.
The assumption of diminishing absolute risk aversion, which is necessary for meaningful
comparative static results in the above cases (and several others), generates counterintuitive
results in case of the impact of unemployment on criminal participation.  The standard
assumption that the individual is risk averse, and that his risk aversion decreases with increasing
income, yields the result that an increase in the unemployment rate decreases the time devoted to
crime.  This counterfactual result emerges in the Schmidt and Witte (1984) model, as well as in
similar models, because increased unemployment reduces income, which in turn reduces crime
via the decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption that is needed to make other results
plausible (Schmidt and Witte 1984, p. 162).
Witte (1980) proposed a model where both time spent in the legal and illegal markets
and legal and illegal consumption are arguments of the utility function.  Her model too,
generates ambiguous comparative static results.  Thus, both Block and Heineke (1975) and
Witte (1980) conclude that theory alone is insufficient to adequately inform policy decisions,
and the guidance of empirical analysis is needed.
Empirical investigations have generally confirmed the predictions of the original
Becker-Ehrlich model uncovering negative impacts on crime of deterrence variables and
improved economic conditions
1 (e.g. Corman and Mocan, forthcoming; Freeman and Rodgers
1999; Mocan and Rees 1999; Grogger 1998; Levitt 1997; Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger 1994;
Witte 1980, Myers 1983).
Although the economic models of crime have revolutionized the analysis of criminal
behavior, they have some other potential shortcomings, in addition to the ones described above.
For example, they fail to recognize the possibility of a bi-directional causality between criminal
activity and its determinants.  Although the impact of potential legal earnings (legal wages) on
                    
1 For a summary of the problems encountered in empirical analyses see Corman and Mocan
(forthcoming).4
crime is part of the traditional economic modeling of crime, previous theoretical work fails to
take into account the possible influence of criminal activity on future labor market
opportunities.  
In addition, recently some social scientists have questioned the power and applicability of
the economic paradigm to analyze criminal behavior.   Some of the explicit or implicit criticisms
include the failure to incorporate individual heterogeneity into the model in a satisfactory manner.
For example Wilson (1994) stated that “[we need to understand]…  that people facing the same
incentives often behave in characteristically different ways because they have been habituated to do
so,” while “changing incentives will not alter the behavior of poorly habituated people as much as
we would like, at least in the near term.”
 2   In other words, differences in individuals’
backgrounds, especially with respect to past participation in criminal activity, necessarily impact
their response to incentives.  Current models fail to address this aspect of heterogeneity.  Along the
same lines, DiIulio (1996) indicates that urban ethnographers believe that today’s crime-prone
youngsters are too present oriented for any type of conventional criminal deterrence to work.  This
implies the difficulty of economics to model and explain the behavior of this new breed of criminal
who many believe comprises a significant segment of criminal activity.
In this paper we propose a new economic model of criminal behavior, which addresses
these and some other important issues in a coherent framework.  The differences between our
model and the existing crime models are described in the next section.  Section III presents the
formal model and its solution.  Section IV displays the consumption and the investment policy of
the individual whose behavior is analyzed.  Section V presents the dynamic optimal behavior of the
individual and responses to various scenarios.  Section VI is the conclusion.
II.  Improvements over Previous Models
Our model differs substantially from earlier models cited above and their more recent
variants.  First, current models of crime are static: individuals make choices at a particular point in
time, responding to exogenously determined incentives and given constraints and preferences,
                    
2 Wilson (1994, p.56), as cited by DiIulio (1996)5
without regard for the impact of today’s decision on future opportunities.
3  Our model is dynamic
and therefore a particular decision (e.g. participation in the criminal sector) has implications both
for future decisions as well as the choices available to the individual in later periods.   In our
model, individuals possess two types of human capital: legal human capital, which determines
expected earnings in the legal sector, and criminal human capital, which determines expected
illegal earnings. In this setting, the endogenous relationship between differentiated human capital
and participation in differentiated labor markets (legal and criminal) is analyzed.
Second, in our model, the individual’s earnings (legal as well as illegal) depend on his
human capital (legal and illegal), and the rate of return to both types of human capital.  In other
words, we adopt a standard human capital earnings model, where an exogenous rate of return and
endogenous human capital determine the realized earnings (along with stochastic shocks).  In this
framework we analyze criminal behavior and its evolution in various scenarios, such as a decline
in the return to human capital of the individual (maybe due to a negative labor demand shock), and
the impact of “neighborhood” or “peer” effects on the acquisition of legal and illegal human
capital.
Third, our model not only allows us to analyze the impact of deterrence and legal market
opportunities on current criminal activity, it also permits analyses of the nature of the incarceration
experience on future behavior.  Thus, this is the first paper to propose an analytical approach to the
effect of various treatment/punishment regimes on the post-incarceration response of optimizing
individuals.  In traditional crime models recidivism (repeated criminal behavior) is a rational
response to unchanging opportunities faced by the criminal. If it is optimal for the individual to
engage in criminal activity given his environment (the return to legal and illegal activities, the
cost of punishment and the probability of apprehension) before he went to prison, it will be
optimal again after he leaves prison since the relevant constraints remain unchanged.  In our
model the individual may or may not engage in criminal activity after leaving prison.  This is
because part of the environment that effects behavior is endogenous and is a function of human
capital appreciation or depreciation while in prison.
                    
3 Two exceptions are Flinn (1986) and Lochner (1999).  Both of these papers introduce dynamics in some
fashion, but they formulate vastly different frameworks than the model we develop in this paper.6
Fourth, the dynamic structure of the model enables us to observe multi-period behavior
of the individual, which provides additional insights unavailable from static models.  For
example, first-generation Becker-Ehrlich type crime models predict that an increase in the
probability of unemployment in the legal sector, proxied for by an increase in the unemployment
rate, increases the likelihood of entry into the illegal sector. These models postulate that this
relationship between unemployment and criminal participation is symmetrical; namely, a
decrease in unemployment decreases criminal participation.  However, the model we propose
generates a different and novel prediction.  In our model, the potential exists for the individual to
participate in the illegal sector during the recession, as predicted by standard theory, but,
contrary to the symmetry implied by the standard model, the individual may tend to remain in
the criminal sector after the recession ends.  This hysteresis, or recession-crime trap, is due to
simultaneous depreciation of legal human capital and the appreciation of criminal human capital
during the recession: in terms of labor market opportunities, he may not be the same person post-
recession.
Fifth, our model is capable of explaining a regularity in criminal activity.  As stated by
Grogger (1998), “…[t]he likelihood of committing crime typically increases with age until the
late teens and then declines.  This relationship is quite robust, and seems to hold up across
countries, at different points in time, and largely irrespective of the way crime is measured. 
Although criminologists have studied this phenomenon extensively, they have yet to explain it
(Gottfredson and Hirshi 1986).” Grogger states that “if criminal behavior responds to wages,
then the age distribution of crime may well be a labor market phenomenon.  Wages represent
the opportunity cost of committing crime, and they rise steeply with age during the early part of
one’s career.” (Grogger 1998, p.757)
4.  Although the rising age-earnings profile of an
individual is a reasonable explanation of the decreased propensity to engage in criminal activity
as one ages, the actual mechanism and dynamics of this relationship remains unclear.  The
aforementioned age-earnings profile pertains to legal workers, and not to criminals.  The increased
age-earnings profile of an individual who has been working in the legal sector is due primarily to
the marketable skills acquired through participation in this sector.  Therefore, an individual who
                    
4 In a different framework, Leung (1994) shows that in a model with no recidivism the falling segment of the age-
crime profile is obtained because a large percentage of offenders are arrested at young ages, and once arrested they7
has participated exclusively in the criminal sector has not accumulated the marketable legal
human capital that would provide higher legal wages later in life.  An individual who has been
participating jointly in both sectors can conceivably increase his human capital over the course of
his life cycle to the level where exclusive participation in the legal sector is optimal.  However, it
is unrealistic to believe that such an individual, one who is presumably employed in a low-
skilled/low-wage legal sector job, would have a steep age-earnings profile.  Put differently, even
though higher wages are expected to deter criminal participation as predicted by standard
theory, it is not obvious why a person, who was a criminal at a younger age, and faced a given
wage level (presumably lower), should command higher wages in the legal sector when he gets
older. 
   Our benchmark model (explained below) provides a mechanism by which even exclusive
participation in the criminal sector throughout an individual’s youth can still lead to switching to
the legal sector later in life.  The mechanism by which this is accomplished is the efficiency with
which savings/investment is translated into legal human capital.  If a participant in the illegal
sector perceives that investment in legal human capital promises a sufficiently high rate of return
once he switches to the legal sector, then it may be optimal for him to limit current consumption
and save for the future.  These savings are then translated into legal human capital via education,
and increased legal human capital generates the switch to the legal sector.
We also analyze the impact of risk aversion on criminal activity.  For example, the
reaction of the present-oriented, low-risk-averse  “new breed” of predator to various incentives
is investigated.  The model also incorporates the concepts of “social capital” and neighborhood
effects and investigates their influence on criminal activity, and investigates the response of the
individual to a change in risk aversion, which may be due to aging, as well as to a change in the
discount rate.
III.  The Benchmark Model.
The individual maximizes expected discounted lifetime utility, which depends on
consumption. There exist two possible income sources, one from participation in the legal sector,
and the other from participation in the illegal sector.  The individual is endowed with given
                                                       
stop committing crimes.8
stocks of legal and illegal human capital and inelastically supplies a unit of labor each period. 
Both types of human capital can be enhanced through investment via savings as well as by
acquiring experience in the relevant sector.  Both types of human capital are subject to
depreciation.  Incomes from both legal and illegal sources are functions of the relevant human
capitals and their respective rates of return.  They are also subject to random shocks. 
The individual lives T periods.  In each period the individual solves a two-stage
dynamic stochastic optimization problem.  First the individual decides in which sector to
participate (legal or illegal), and after the realization of income in that period, he decides on
the optimal amount of consumption. These ideas are formalized as follows.
The individual maximizes








where b is the time discount (0<b<1), ct stands for consumption at time t, and E is the
expectations operator.  The utility function U(ct) depicted in (1) takes on the usual constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) form, where s denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion.









The model does not allow borrowing.  Thus, the following holds between consumption (ct),
savings (st) and income (yt).
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The individual is endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied in either the criminal or legal
sector.  Income is determined by   yt = max(y
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where  Ly>0 represents a lower bound on income, suggesting that welfare programs and other
types of social networks provide a positive amount of income to the individual.  y
c
t stands for
income from criminal sector at period  t, and y
l
t  represents income from the legal sector at time9
t. h
cand h
lrepresent criminal and legal human capital, respectively; r
c and r
l stand for the
returns to criminal and legal human capitals, respectively, and e and m are shocks to income with
E[e]=0, E[m]=0.  We also postulate that E[em]=0, which indicates that unexpected shocks to
legal income (such as a recession) are not correlated with perturbations in illegal income.  The
shocks have normal distributions with standard deviations std(e) and std (m).
Human capital evolves according to the following difference equations.
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Equation (5A) indicates that participation in the criminal sector enhances criminal human
capital by y.  This means that individuals become more skilled criminals as they acquire criminal
experience.  According to Equation (5B), participation in the legal sector at time t improves legal
human capital by W, which suggests that legal human capital is enhanced by labor market
experience.  Additionally, legal human capital can also be increased by investment, which is
equal to savings (st).  In other words, individuals have the option of saving part of their income,
and using it to invest in their legal human capital through schooling, training and similar
avenues.  The notion of investment in human capital is standard (Ben-Porath 1967, Grossman
1972, Becker 1993).  On the other hand, the concept of allowing the individual to hold two types
of human capital simultaneously within the context of a dynamic crime model has not been
explored before.  l denotes the efficiency with which legal human capital is acquired. Note that
both forms of human capital are subject to depreciation( ) d d
c and 
l .
In this benchmark model the individual makes a discrete decision to participate in either
the legal sector or the illegal sector in each period.  Put differently, we do not permit (initially)
the individual to divide his time between working at the grocery store part-time and committing
robberies part-time.  The essence of the model is that an optimizing individual makes a decision
as to which sector (legal vs. criminal) to participate in at the beginning of each period, and then,
over time, he has the option of switching between the two sectors as a response to evolving10
human capital.  Nevertheless, as an extension, we also modeled the behavior allowing joint
participation in both sectors.  The joint strategy (participation in both the legal and criminal
sectors) became the optimal choice in very limited cases.  Almost always the optimal strategy
was to participate in a single sector for a given time period.  The results did not change
qualitatively under joint participation, and therefore we report the results obtained from the
benchmark case presented in Equations (1)-(5).
The stochastic dynamic program described above leads to the following Bellman equation:
(6) E ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
l l
1 1 1 0 , max , + + + < < + = t
c
t t t y c t
c
t t h h EV c U h h V b .
This describes the expected value at the present time period of a given combination of
human capital stock in terms of optimal participation, consumption, and investment decisions
plus the discounted expected value of the resultant human capital combination next period.   It is
well-known that Equation (6) is equivalent to the maximized value of Equation (1), subject to the
appropriate constraints.  The problem is too complicated to yield a closed form analytic solution.
However, the Bellman equation in (6) can be used as the basis for accurate numerical
approximations of policy (optimal sector participation and consumption) for the individual for
any period.  This is accomplished by working recursively from the end of life (period T) back to
period one (similar applications of dynamic programming can be found in Deaton 1992 in the
analysis of consumption and savings, and in the unemployment analysis of Gomes, Greenwood
and Rebelo 1997).  With a suitably large selection of T (T>10 for the range of parameters used
in this paper), policy converges to a stationary state, and this permits effective time-series
analysis.
5
Once the optimal policy is found, we are able to study the behavior of the individual
under various regimes including income, punishment, rehabilitation, neighborhood, and
preference sets.  Using time-series graphs, we explore the dynamic response of the individual to
changes in the relevant parameters. 
The estimates of constant relative risk aversion obtained from property/liability insurance
and equity pricing analyses range from 1.2 (Szpiro 1986) to 4.0 (Pindyck 1988).  In the
                    
5 The basic theory of recursive programming is well presented in Stokey et al. (1989).11
benchmark model we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion (s) to 3.0.  Empirical estimates
of the returns to education suggest that five percent rate of return is a good estimate for the
return to legal human capital.  Thus, both r
c and r
l  set equal to 0.05 in the benchmark
specification.  Similarly, we specified the following parameters as follows. Ly=10
-4, y= 0.5,
W= 0.1, l=2, d
c=0.05, d
l=0.05 s=3.0, b=0.5, std(e)=0.2, std(m)=0.1, where std stands for
standard deviation of the shocks to income.   Notice that the standard deviation of shocks to
criminal income is higher than that of legal income, reflecting the assumption that criminal
activity is riskier than legal activity. It should also be noted that the results were robust with
respect to the selection of these parameter values.
IV.  Consumption and Investment Policy
Figures 1A and 1B provide a general introduction to the nature of policy generated by the
model.   In the figures, two pieces of information are put together.  The vertical axes display the
amount of expected consumption (or investment), and the sign of these consumption and
investment values signify the sector in which the individual is participating.  Positive values
represent participation in the legal sector, and negative values imply criminal activity.  Figure 1A
displays expected consumption policy of the individual in period T as a function of legal and
criminal human capital. As the figure demonstrates, when the stock of criminal human capital
dominates legal human capital, criminal participation (expected consumption measured on the
negative direction) is generated.  Relatively high values of legal human capital, on the other
hand, are associated with positive consumption values, indicating that the individual is a
participant in the legal sector.   Figure 1B demonstrates that because the individual is at the end
of his life (time=T) he subscribes to the “you can’t take it with you” policy and consumes of all
his income (thus, generating zero savings and investment at T). 
Figures 2A and 2B display steady state (stationary) consumption and investment policy,
respectively, for the benchmark parameters.  Note that the consumption values are smaller than
those prevailing in period T (Figure 1A) for certain combinations of criminal and legal human
capital, because the individual is saving part of his income.  Steady state investment (which is
equal to savings) is displayed in Figure 2B.  As in other figures, Figure 2B shows the amount of
savings of the individual as well as sector of participation.  For example, if the individual has 812
units of legal human capital and 2 units of criminal human capital, he saves and invests part of
his income to enhance his legal capital, and he works in the legal sector (because investment is
positive).  On the other hand, if criminal capital is equal to 8 units and legal capital is equal to 2
units, the individual is participating in the criminal sector, although he is saving part of his
criminal income to increase his legal human capital (this can be seen by the negative value of the
investment in Figure 2B when criminal capital=8 and legal capital=2).  
The fact that the criminal saves part of his income and invests it to increase his legal
human capital captures the essence of the model, and it is an explanation of how individuals who
are participating in the criminal sector early in their lives are switching to the legal sector later.  
       It should be noted that this behavior of investing to legal human capital (even for
criminals) is not true under all circumstances.  For example, Figures 3A and 3B present
stationary investment policy for two different types of individuals.  Keeping all other parameters
the same, Figure 3A displays the policy of an individual who has low risk aversion (s=1.3), and
Figure 3B pertains to an individual who is highly risk averse (s=6).  The “new breed of
criminal” is typically described as someone with a high level of criminal human capital and low
risk aversion.  It can be seen in Figure 3A that a new breed of “risk-lover” criminal with high
criminal human capital and low legal human capital has zero investment to his legal human
capital. In fact, such low risk aversion as depicted by s=1.3 in Figure 3A makes it optimal for
most individuals not to invest in legal human capital.  On the other hand, if the person is highly
risk averse as depicted by Figure 3B (where s=6), he saves part of his criminal income, and
invests in his legal human capital, even if he is a criminal who possesses a high amount of
criminal capital and low legal human capital.   Thus, Figures 3A and 3B show how risk aversion
impacts the investment in legal human capital, and they indicate that individuals who have low
risk aversion and high criminal human capital may not switch to the legal sector as they age.
Figures 4A and 4B display the stationary investment policy of the individual under the
benchmark parameters, in response to variations in the returns to legal and criminal human
capital. In Figure 4A the return to criminal human capital, r




l=0.05).  As a result, investment in legal capital is made only if
existing criminal human capital is low.  According to Figure 4A, if the amount of criminal
capital is larger than 3, the individual does not invest anything in his legal capital because of the13
relatively favorable rate of return to criminal human capital in comparison to legal human
capital.
Figure 4B displays the investment policy when the rate of return to criminal human
capital is 0.05, but the rate of return to legal human capital is 0.2.  In essence, this graph
represents the “carrot and stick” scenario described by Freeman (1996).  A low return to
criminal human capital can be attributed to effective law enforcement, and a high return to legal
capital can be representative of a strong labor market.  Under this scenario, individuals with
substantial amounts of criminal human capital have much larger propensity to invest in their legal
human capital.    The negative investment values in Figure 4B demonstrate the amount of legal
human capital investment done by criminals.  As can be seen, individuals with large amounts of
criminal capital save part of their criminal income and invest in their legal capital.  Thus, Figures
4A and 4B demonstrate that changes in the returns to legal and criminal human capital can be
effective means of influencing criminal activity through their influence on investment in legal
capital.  This aspect of the model will further be demonstrated in the next section.
Income in legal and criminal sectors depends not only on the respective levels of human
capital and the rates of return, but also on the random shocks to income (see Equation 4).  A
high variance of these shocks signifies increased volatility and is associated with increased risk. 
For example, if the standard deviation of e is high, this suggests that an unexpected large positive
shock to criminal income may be followed by an unexpected large negative one.  The uncertainly
in the perturbations to income influences behavior as depicted by Figures 5A and 5B.  Stationary
investment policy when crime is not risky is displayed in Figure 5A, where the standard
deviation of the shocks to criminal income is only one-third of that for legal income. Here,
participants in the legal sector invest most of the earnings to hedge against future risk.  In
contrast, participants in the criminal sector are unmotivated to invest in their legal capital.
In Figure 5B the standard deviation of illegal income shocks are three times greater than
the corresponding shocks in legal income (std(e)=0.3, std(m)=0.1), making it more risky to
participate in the criminal sector.  Thus, criminals find it optimal to invest in their legal capital. 
The contrast between Figures 5A and 5B is striking.  In Figure 5B, even the individuals who
possess very large amounts of criminal capital (who did not invest when the uncertainty of
criminal income was smaller than the uncertainty of legal income in Figure 5A) decide to invest14
in their legal human capital as insurance against the relative high uncertainty around the criminal
income.
V.   The Dynamic Optimal Behavior
Figures 6-9 depict the individual’s optimal decision path under various scenarios.  These
figures include the time path of both legal and criminal human capital, and an indicator variable,
which represents the sector in which the individual chooses to participate.  If the individual
chooses the criminal sector, the indicator variable takes the value of –1; it is equal to 1 for
participation in the legal sector.
A.  The Impact of a Recession
Figure 6 displays the optimal dynamic behavior of the individual before, during and after
a recession.  The individual’s legal human capital is higher than his illegal human capital in
period one, and he is a participant in the legal sector.  The recession is simulated by imposing
five consecutive negative values for m (the shock to legal income in Equation 4), starting with
time period 2 and ending with period 6.  Given consecutive bad draws of legal income, it would
not be surprising to see the individual begin to participate in the criminal sector.  Indeed,
although the individual still finds it optimal to stay in the legal sector during the first four periods
of the recession (periods 2-5), he switches to the criminal sector in period six (the sector
indicator switches from +1 to –1 in period 6).   It is important to note behavior of the human
capital during the recession.  Between periods 1 and 5 the individual is participating in the legal
sector.  As a result, his criminal human capital depreciates during that period.  However, his
legal human capital also depreciates during the same period because of the impact of the
recession.  Negative income shocks during the recession (negative values of m) reduce his legal
income (see Equation 4), which lowers his savings.  Even though the legal human capital tends
to increase over time because of the experience in the legal sector (depicted by W in Equation
5B), the increase in legal human capital is not large enough to offset the decrease generated by
depreciation (d
l in Equation 5B).  Thus, the net effect of a recession is the decrease in the legal
human capital.  Starting with period 6, the individual finds it optimal to switch to the criminal
sector.15
The novelty of our dynamic model can be seen in an analysis of human capital and the 
participation decision after the recession.   Participation in the criminal sector during a recession
increases the individual’s criminal human capital and decreases his legal human capital, which is
demonstrated by Figure 6.  The increase in criminal capital and the corresponding decrease in
legal capital make it difficult to switch back to the legal sector after the recession is over.  In
Figure 6, the recession ends in period 7, but the person finds it optimal to stay in the criminal
sector after the recession.
The criminal trap, or hysteresis in criminal activity that emerges in our model is in sharp
contrast to the predictions of the standard model.  The current static crime models posit a
symmetry in the pre- and post-recession behavior of the individual: a decrease in legal earnings
potential during the recession pulls the individual to crime, and an increase in potential legal
earnings after the recession brings him back to the legal sector.  By contrast, in our model, as
seen in Figure 6, the individual does not switch back to the legal sector after the recession is
over: he is not the same person after the recession.
B. Social Capital and Neighborhood Effects
The concept of social capital has been recently introduced into quantitative analysis of
individual behavior.  Becker (1996, p.12) states that “[c]onsumption and other activities have a
major social component partly because they take place in public.  As a result, people often
choose restaurants, neighborhoods, schools, books to read, political opinions, food, or leisure
activities with an eye to pleasing peers and others in their social network.”  The work of
Coleman (1990) on social capital, and Becker’s article on the impact of others’ demands on an
individual’s own demand (Becker 1991) emphasize the role of social interactions on economic
behavior.   Becker states that “Since [social] capital captures the effects of the social milieu, an
individual’s stock of social capital depends not primarily on his own choices, but on the choices
of peers in the relevant network of interactions” (Becker 1996, p.12).  The impact of peer
influence on criminal behavior is stated by Kahan (1998) as “Residents of gang-ridden
neighborhoods are not invariably poorer than the residents of relatively gang-free ones.  Nor is
law-enforcement in gang-ridden neighborhoods invariably laxer.  Rather, the difference between
these communities lies mainly in attitudes of their residents towards gangs…[p]erceptions16
construct meanings that motivate the decision to join a gang or not.  In gang-free neighborhoods,
the belief that others value gang membership negatively strengthens the aversion that individual
juveniles have toward joining them.  But in gang-ridden ones the belief that their peers admire
gang members can make joining one seem worthwhile even to juveniles who are otherwise  only
weakly committed or even opposed to gangs.” (Kahan 1998).
To incorporate these ideas and the impact of social capital on behavior, we introduce a
“neighborhood effect” into the analysis.  A “harmful neighborhood effect” on criminal
participation exists if there is high criminal participation in the neighborhood by peers, and
therefore it is easier to enhance criminal capital through participation due to this criminal
environment, or culture.  More precisely, in Equation 5A, a high value of y represents an
undesirable peer or neighborhood effect on criminal human capital, while a low value of y
indicates a low neighborhood effect, where criminal participation does not impact next period’s
human capital very heavily.   Similarly, a low value of l (Equation 5B) can be construed as a
harmful neighborhood effect since attempts to acquire legal human capital are hampered.
The contrast between Figures 7A and 7B present the impact of neighborhood effect.  To
simulate a strong criminal neighborhood effect, y is set to 2, W is set to zero and l is equal to
0.1 in Figure 7A.  On the other hand, a small criminal neighborhood effect is simulated in
Figure 7B by setting y to 0.1, W to 0.2, and l to 2. 
In Figure 7A the individual is participating in the legal sector initially.  The disincentive
to invest in legal human capital (low l and W), and the efficiency with which criminal capital is
acquired (high y) motivates him to switch to, and stay in the criminal sector after period 5.  On
the other hand, Figure 7B shows that despite that fact the individual has substantially more
criminal human capital in the beginning, and therefore a participant of the criminal sector, the
low neighborhood effect makes it optimal to switch to the legal sector.  He invests in his legal
human capital, increasing it from period 1 to period 2.  The same is true for periods 2 and 3, and
he switches to the legal sector in period 4.
C. Imprisonment
The potential importance of rehabilitation on post-prison behavior is acknowledged by
researchers as well as members of the criminal justice system.  Administrators of the California17
and Federal prison systems indicated that “… rehabilitation programming was being made
available… to provide the opportunities and experiences to enable individuals in less destructive,
more socially acceptable ways” (California Department of Correction, 1978, Vol II, p.8 as cited
by Witte 1983).  Unlike previous economic models of crime, our model allows the investigation
of the impact of various imprisonment scenarios on post-incarceration behavior.  Imprisonment is
simulated as a period during which the income of the inmate is constant and set to a low
(subsistence) level in Equation 4.  Low income does not allow savings and investment.  The
impact of the prison term on post-period criminal activity is analyzed by investigating the
influence of rehabilitation and prison culture.  In this analysis, in Equations 5A and 5B y and S 
stand for the impact of the prison culture and rehabilitation, respectively.  More precisely, if
y>0 this means that the prison culture enhances criminal human capital.  If  S>0 this suggests
that the prison provides education, job training and other legal human capital enhancing skills,
which we will call rehabilitation.  While in prison, both types of human capital depreciate (see
Equations 5A and 5B).  The post-prison activity of the individual in general depends on how fast
both types of human capital depreciate in relation to each other, as well as the magnitudes of the
rehabilitation (S), and prison culture (y).
In the simulations we perform, we impose a 5-period prison term on an individual who
already decided to participate in the criminal sector.  In this framework, we investigate how
different regimes impact the post-prison behavior.  Figure 8A is the benchmark case where the
time-series behaviors of both legal and criminal human capital, as well as sector choice are
displayed.  As can be seen from Figure 8A, the indicator variable is –1 everywhere, indicating
that the individual finds it optimal to be a criminal.
Figures 8B-8D display the simulations based on various imprisonment regimes for the
same individual depicted in Figure 8A.  In Figure 8B there is no rehabilitation or prison culture
(y=S=0).  The person participates in the criminal sector in period 1, goes to prison between
periods 2 and 6.  He finds it optimal to go back to the criminal sector for the periods 7-9, during
which time he invests in his legal human capital, and switches to the legal sector in period 10.
Figure 8C portrays the same individual as in Figure 8A and 8B.  However, this time
the individual is exposed to a strong prison culture, which enhances his criminal human
capital (y=1). This takes place through learning from other inmates.  In the simulation that18
generated Figure 8C it is also assumed that the prison does not provide enhancement to the
legal capital (S=0).  In this case, the criminal human capital of the inmate appreciates, and his
legal human capital depreciates while in prison, and when he leaves the prison in period 7, he
is a better criminal than before (with more criminal human capital).  Thus he finds it optimal
to participate in the criminal sector after leaving the prison, and he stays in the criminal sector
thereafter.
Figure 8D displays the impact of a strong rehabilitation regime while in prison between
periods 2 and 6.  In particular, the impact of the prison culture is eliminated  (y is set to zero),
and it is assumed that legal human capital appreciates through rehabilitation and training while
prison (S=1).  Under these conditions, the criminal human capital of the person declines while
in prison, while his legal human capital increases.  As a result, when he leaves the prison in
period 7, he finds it optimal to participate in the legal sector. 
D.  Reactions to the Severity of Punishment
Following the standard practice in the Becker-Ehrlich tradition of expressing sanctions
in monetary terms, variations in illegal income can be attributed to variations in law
enforcement.  Variations in the return to illegal human capital (r
c) provide a convenient means
by which to model the effects of the severity of punishment and its impact on sectoral
participation.   For example, a decrease in the returns to criminal capital may represent an
increase in the severity of punishment as a given amount of criminal human capital is
generating a lower level of income than before.
Figure 9B displays the dynamic reaction of the individual to an increased severity of
punishment in comparison to the benchmark case displayed in Figure 9A.  In Figure 9A, the
return to criminal human capital is 0.1.  The individual depicted in Figure 9A chooses to be a
criminal in period 1, does not invest in his legal human capital, and stays a criminal for the
remaining time periods.  In Figure 9B we observe his behavior in response to an decrease in
the return to criminal human capital (a decline in r
c  to 0.02).  After participating in the
criminal sector in periods 1, 2, and 3 and investing in his legal human capital during the same
period, he switches to the legal sector in period 4, and finds it optimal be to in the legal sector19
thereafter.
E.  Changes in Risk Aversion
Previous sub-sections demonstrated how the individual reacts to changes in the returns
to criminal activity, to the neighborhood effects, to the rehabilitation in the prison, and to a
recession by switching between criminal and legal sectors over time.  Another way the
individual may switch between sectors is due to a change in his risk aversion.  Although the
risk aversion parameter (F) is exogenous in the model, it is conceivable that it can increase
over time.  This may simply reflect the possibility that the individual becomes more risk
averse as he gets older.  There exists empirical evidence on a positive relationship between
age and risk aversion (e.g. Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998, Palsson 1996).
Figure 10 demonstrates the optimal behavior of the individual when his risk aversion
increases.  The individual is a criminal in periods 1-4.  As a result, his criminal human capital is
rising and his legal human capital is declining over this period.  In period 5 risk aversion
parameter (F) rises from 1.3 to 6.  Because of this change, the individual starts investing more
heavily in his legal human capital, which generates a net increase in his legal human capital. 
Although it is still optimal to be a criminal in periods 5, 6, and 7, the individual switches to the
legal sector in period 8.  Thus, consistent with Figures 3A and 3B, an increase in risk aversion
generates increased investment in legal capital, which eventually yields a switch to the legal
sector.  This is another avenue through which criminals can switch to the legal sector over time.
F.  Changes  in Time Preference
Becker and Murphy (1988) show that persons with high discount rates for the future are
more likely to participate in addictive behaviors.  Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1991) show
that more educated people are more future oriented, which suggests a positive correlation
between education and time discount.  As summarized by Grossman (2000), and Becker (1996),
the standard practice in economics is to assume that the time discount rate on future utility is
constant for an individual, although it may differ across individuals.  Furthermore, it is assumed
that the causality runs from time preference to schooling.  A recent paper by Becker and
Mulligan (1997) postulates that the present value of utility is higher, the smaller the rate of time
preference for the present [b=1/(1+g), where g is the rate of time preference for the present]. 
Thus, individuals have incentives to make investments that lower the rate of time preference for20
the present.  Becker and Mulligan show that the rate of time preference falls as the level of
education rises, because education increases income and life expectancy.  Thus, following
Becker and Mulligan (1997) it can be argued that as individuals invest in their legal human
capital their rate of time preference goes down, indicating an increase in b.
Figure 11 demonstrates the impact of the increase in b.  The individual depicted in
Figure 11 participates in the criminal sector from period 1 to 5.  His criminal human capital is
higher than his legal human capital.  Criminal human capital is increasing during this period
because of participation in the criminal sector.  Legal human capital is rising also, because of
savings. In periods 1-5 b=0.4.  In period 5 we increased b to 0.6 in order to reflect the
Becker-Mulligan scenario of changing time discount due to increased education. As Figure 11
shows, the result is a switch to the legal sector in period 6.  Thus, this exercise demonstrates
that a change in time preference is also capable to generating a switch between criminal and
legal sectors in this model.
VI.  Conclusion
  This paper presents a new economic model of criminal activity.   Individuals
possess two types of human capital: legal and criminal.  Criminal human capital can be
enhanced by participating in criminal activity.  Legal human capital can be enhanced by
working in the legal sector, or by schooling (by saving part of the income—legal or
criminal, and investing it to legal capital).  Each type of human capital is subject to
depreciation.  Potential income in each sector depends on the level of the human capital,
the relevant rate of return, and random shocks.  In this two-stage dynamic stochastic
model, in each period the individual decides in which sector to participate (legal or illegal),
and after the realization of income in that period, he decides on the optimal amount of
consumption.
The endogenous relationship between differentiated human capital and
differentiated labor markets (legal and criminal) renders the individual’s labor market
opportunities endogenous. The choices made in each period influence the opportunities
available in future periods. 
The model provides a framework in which the interplay between criminal
participation, legal market earnings, and deterrence can be analyzed.  Thus, for the first
time in a consistent intertemporal model, the analysis of the effects of recessions,21
neighborhood effects, various imprisonment/rehabilitation scenarios, risk aversion, and
time preferences on criminal behavior is possible.
Several critically important issues in the analysis of criminal behavior remain
unresolved due to the time-dependant nature of the problems—but are effectively
addressed in our model. For example, our model allows an analytical approach to the
effect of various treatment/punishment regimes on the post-incarceration response of
optimizing individuals.  In traditional crime models, recidivism is a rational response to
unchanging opportunities faced by the criminal.  If it is optimal for the individual to
engage in criminal activity before he went to prison, it will still be optimal after he
leaves prison if the environment remains unchanged.  In our model the individual may
or may not engage in criminal activity after leaving prison.  This is because part of the
environment that affects behavior is endogenous and is a function of the appreciation-
depreciation of human capital while in prison.
The model generates some new insights, which are different from those
provided by static models. For example, Becker-Ehrlich type crime models predict that
an increase in the probability of unemployment in the legal sector, represented by an
increase in the unemployment rate, increases the likelihood of entry into the illegal
sector.  These models postulate that this relationship between unemployment and
criminal participation is symmetrical; namely, a decrease in unemployment decreases
criminal participation.   In our model, the potential exists for the individual to find it
optimal to participate in the illegal sector during the recession, as predicted by standard
theory; but, contrary to the symmetry implied by the standard model, the individual
may tend to remain in the criminal sector after the recession ends.  This is due to
simultaneous depreciation of legal human capital and the appreciation of criminal
human capital during the recession.
The model is capable of explaining a regularity in criminal activity, which is the reduced
propensity of an individual to engage in criminal activity as he/she ages.  A switch from the
criminal sector to the legal sector can be optimal in a number of ways.  First, criminals may find
it optimal to acquire legal human capital as a hedge against the uncertainty around criminal
income.  The investment in legal human capital while being a criminal is a primary endogenous22
mechanism which makes the decision to switch to the legal sector optimal.  Exogenous channels
which may create the same behavior include changes in time preference (due to education) and
changes in risk aversion (due to aging).
The model also incorporates the concepts of social capital and neighborhood effects and
investigates their influence on criminal activity.  Similarly, the impact of a decrease in the return
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